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Abstract 
 Nomads are positioned outside of the modern conception of nations, which is based on a 
traditional or modern hierarchical model (Kuzio 2001) which tends to “dehistoricize and 
essentialize tradition” (Chatterjee 2010: 169). Using an analysis of the narrative construction of 
nomadic Kalmyk nationhood, particularly through historiography and culture, it demonstrates 
that in spite of nation-destroying efforts from the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, the 
Kalmyk nation has been flexible with reinventing cultural strategies in charting the nomadic 
national imaginary from Chinggis Khan to the Dalai Lama. It argues that nomadic nationhood 
contains a deeply imaginary response to nomads’ cultural and intellectual milieu which provided 
a way of freeing itself from Tsarist and Soviet modular narratives of national imagination, 
demonstrating how nomadic nationhood exists as a non-modular form of nationhood. 
Keywords: Kalmyks, nomads, nation-destroying, Russia, Eurasia 
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Introduction  
 With cultural and political identities which transcend fixed territorial boundaries, 
nomadic populations have always represented an obstacle to efforts of state consolidation (Scott 
1999). Attempts to anchor the nomads resemble Walker Connor’s (1994) idea of ‘nation-
destroying’ which occurs when states seek to consolidate and assimilate varying groups residing 
within its territorial borders. The claims to the right of nomadic nationhood, sovereignty, and 
territoriality are not the focus of existing nomadic studies and neither has much consideration 
been given to the forms and dynamics of nomadic nationhood in respect to nationalism studies. 
Yet, nomadic forms of nationhood have been writ large in the process of nation formation in 
different regional contexts and our understanding of nomadic conceptions of nationhood have 
been limited. This article seeks rectify this by offering an interpretative account of nomadic 
nationhood through an analysis of the narrative construction of nomadic Kalmyk nationhood by 
focusing on Kalmyk historiography and culture.  
 The Republic of Kalmykia is a steppe region of modern nomads, the remnants of the 
Mongolian Empire in South European Russia. Despite the geographic (nearly 6,000 km) and 
political isolation (over four centuries) from Mongolia (including Inner Mongolia, Outer 
Mongolia, and Buryatia), Kalmyks sustained, though with a different degree of success, their 
political autonomy, demographic balance, and culture. Perhaps no other modern population in 
Europe or Russia has been linked to the native Mongolian transcontinental governance of 
Chinggis Khan as closely as the Kalmyk nomads. Positioned between the Manchu and Moscow 
rising powers, Kalmyks, known as Western Mongols (Jungars) and Oirats (in medieval and early 
modern historiography), were the last nomads who held transcontinental sovereign power in the 
Eurasian steppe (Kolesnik 2003, Perdue 2005). The essence of nomadic nationhood (sometimes 
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adapting to quasi-national forms) persisted, while ranging from such forms as the Jungar and 
Kalmyk Khanates in the seventeenth century to the post-Soviet Kalmyk Republic.  
 In academic research, nomads and their cultural construction of nations is a neglected 
theme, since existing studies of nomadism work from a modernisation perspective (Ginat and 
Khazanov 1998, Kradin 2006, Perdue 2005). In international journalism, reliable information 
about the Eurasian nomads is difficult to obtain, since Moscow and Beijing “exercise what to all 
intents and purposes is an overlordship,” keeping the Eurasian nomadic populations closed to the 
outside world (Serebrennikov 1931). Within this context, the questions which require addressing 
are: (1) what did the Kalmyks themselves narrate about the importance of nomadic nationhood 
and transcontinental governance? (2) why are these nomadic narratives significant for a 
conceptualisation of nomadic nationhood? (3) how is nomadic nationhood distinct from 
conventional forms of nation statehood? With a focus on nomadic nation-narration, the article 
proposes a different interpretation of nomadic nation, revealing it as a deeply imaginary response 
to nomads’ cultural and intellectual milieu, particularly to Eurasian geopolitics following the 
collapse of the Chinggis Khan, Romanov, and Soviet Empires. 
 According to Connor (1994), past research on nations and nationalism has paid little 
attention to the evidence of nation-destroying. Connor stated that scholars employ such term as 
‘nation-building’ in discussing ethnically homogeneous case studies. For example, in Germany 
the leaders of nationalism can evoke mass loyalty to Deutschland [the state] and to volksdeautsch 
[the nation], triggering the same associations between the state and the nation in the popular 
psyche. Similar convictions appeal to the Han Chinese, as they perceive the state of China as the 
state of their particular nation. On the other hand, the symbol of one united nation evokes 
different associations among Western Mongols, Tibetans, and Uighurs in the name of China, as 
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well as Crimean Tatars, Kazan Tatars, and Kalmyk-Mongols in the name of Russia. These 
observations, which perceive their nation and the state as two distinct entities, are neither weak 
nor merely outliers in the analysis of nations and nationalism. Rather, these observations need to 
be included in the analysis if we are to assume that nations are a generalizable social 
phenomenon beyond the sedentary world.  
 Connor (1994: 42) argued that theories of ‘nation-building’ tend to present the matter of 
national identities, including the claims to the right of self-determination, superficially as a minor 
obstacle to effective state integration. The semantic ambivalence between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ 
substantiates the improper utilization of the key term ‘nation-building’ when instead it is ‘state 
integration’ with the true goal of ‘nation-destroying.’ The distinction between state and nation is 
clearly manifested in the nomadic cultural resilience against ‘nation-destroying’ by the Tsarist 
and Soviet state policies.  
 Nomadic nations are defined here, beyond the tangible characteristics (a common 
descent, language, religion, territory, etc.), as “a psychological bond that joins a people and 
differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most 
vital way” (Connor 1994: 197). The durability of conviction of being a nomadic nation stems not 
from an ‘identity’ but instead from ‘difference’ (Chatterjee 1993: 5) with the ‘modular 
narratives’ of nations and nationalisms prescribed by the Tsarist and Soviet (hereafter Russian) 
state regimes.3  
                                                 
3 The notion of ‘modular nationalism’ refers to perceived specific models and forms upon which nationhood is 
premised. Within Nationalism Studies scholars have understood this as European/western modular form of 
nationhood linked to the process of modernisation which has been diffused globally (Kedourie 1993, Gellner 1983, 
Anderson 1983). Indeed, one critique from post-colonialist scholars of nationalism is that the diffusion of Western 
and European modular processes and narratives of nationhood leaves non-Western nationalisms with little left to 
‘imagine’ (Chatterjee 1993: 5). 
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 In this article, the emphasis on the process of nation-destroying instead of nation-building 
highlights critical aspects of the different catalysts to which nomadic consciousness responds 
with cultural ingenuity for national survival. Fuelled by the state’s modular narrative, a nation-
destroying bureaucratic machine gradually takes control of nomadic nations through the removal 
of the nomadic ownership of symbolic cultural narration. Despite the Russian modular 
interpretation of nations, the Mongol-Turkic nations and their distinct national identity came into 
existence long before the fall of imperial power or transferal from Tsarist to Soviet and post-
Soviet regimes. The contemporary nations of Eurasia were the result of both nation-destroying, 
through a modular narrative of imagined identities, and the cultural resilience of a nomadic 
narrative of imagined difference. 
 The article is divided into three main sections. The first outlines how the Russians and 
Soviets understood nomadic nationhood. The article begins with the argument that past research 
of nomadism only works from a modernisation perspective. Nomads are positioned outside of 
the domain of modern nations, which is based on a traditional/modern hierarchical trap (Kuzio 
2001) to “dehistoricize and essentialize tradition” (Chatterjee 2010: 169). Past accounts describe 
the Kalmyks as tribal people in perpetual transition, never fully reaching a more civilised, 
Christianised, urbanised, industrialised condition (Kolesnik 2003, Perdue 2005). In this socio-
political formula, Kalmyks are viewed as nomads who are not capable of governing and building 
their versions of states and nations. However, nomadic writings and archaeological evidence 
challenge this perspective suggesting the Mongol-Tatar imperial origin of modern nation-states 
in Eurasia. Nomadic governance and institutions persisted long after the nomadic empire 
disintegrated.  
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 The second section discusses how the Kalmyk nomads narrated their nomadic nationhood 
conveying the myths of territorial affinity with the Great Steppe of the nomads, as well as 
political practices of statehood, organisational knowledge, governing models, and symbolic 
traditions. The third section highlights the Tsarist and Soviet regimes deliberate process of 
nation-destroying where their aim was to marginalize the distinct nomadic culture and silence 
nomadic political claims of nationhood.  It is important to note that the Tsarist and Soviet 
nationality policies targeted not only the Kalmyk nomads. Other minorities were persecuted and 
displaced. Thus, Kalmykia is not the only case of nation-destroying, but rather nation-destroying 
is revealed through this one particular case study of Kalmykia. The case of Kalmykia raises 
larger issues in the debate on nationhood by highlighting that ‘being a nation’ does not mean 
being a static and fixed entity, but rather a continually changing psychological force of 
conviction that depends on the dynamic tension between the narration practices of nation-
destroying knowledge and the cultural resilience through a nation-narration of imagined 
difference. 
 A re-examination of nations from the position of nomadic narration sheds light on the 
cultural limitations of our understanding of nations and nationalisms in contemporary politics. 
The misinterpretation of understandings of nomadic nationhood can be related to some conflicts 
that arise in respect of contemporary claims of self-determination in disputed centre-periphery 
conflicts in the post-Chinggisid Eurasia such as in Xinjiang4, Tibet5 and Tatar Crimea6. Hence, it 
                                                 
4 After the disintegration of Chinggis Khan’s Empire, Jungar [Western Mongol] leaders held power in steppe, 
including Xinjiang, until the destruction of the Jungar Khanate by the Manchu empire in 1760. The Jungar land, 
including the area of Xinjiang, was left empty for a state-sponsored social and demographic expansion. 
5 Compared to the massacre policies toward the Jungars, the Manchu leaders did not eliminate completely the 
Tibetan lamas of the Yellow Teaching (Perdue 2005: 285). The nation-destroying policies in Tibet were postponed 
until 1959 when the Dalai Lama fled his country from the Chinese Communist regime. 
6 In 1783, Empress Catherine II declared the end of the Crimean Khanate, a successor of the Mongol-Tatar Horde. 
The Khanate’s territories were annexed into a new re-imagined social space ‘Tavrida Oblast’ under the Greek 
Herodotus toponymy project of the Russian colonial imagination (Hakan Kirimli 1996). 
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becomes important to recognize the ‘anchoring’ signs of the state against the signs of nomadic 
nations and their proclaimed sovereignty. Our understanding of nations will benefit from the 
analysis of the modular stability of cultural and political institutions that operate on the 
traditional assumptions of the sedentary narrative (Bhabha 1990). In positioning the debate from 
the contrasting narrative of nomadic nations allows us to articulate the crossing and 
interdependence of cultural boundaries.  
 
Russian and Soviet understanding of nomadic nationhood 
 Past research on the varieties of modernisation of nomads by sedentary states 
acknowledged the deficiencies of modernisation theory as a sedentary narrative of socio-
economic and political development, which was ascribed to other nations (Ginat and Khazanov 
1998, Kradin 1992). Nevertheless, scholars have still suggested nomads “must be accepted as 
full-fledged citizens of modernising states” and “benefit from their membership in society at 
large” (Ginat and Khazanov 1998: 3). Moreover, they have argued, that – despite the detrimental 
paternalistic policies toward nomads that doomed them to be economically and politically 
dependent – nomads “can not be left alone” and “their own resources are too meagre to be 
sufficient for spontaneous modernisation” (Ginat and Khazanov 1998: 3). The cultural 
complexity of nomads is commonly measured against the cultural performance indicators of 
sedentary societies, such as fixed residence, urbanization, a density of population, and 
technological specialization (Kradin 2006). Despite these methodological limitations, hidden 
narratives highlight the nomadic cultural ingenuity in their national adaptation over time under 
the pressures of technological advancement (Perdue 2005: 21).  
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 From the ancient Scythians to the contemporary Kalmyks, the nomads of Eurasia 
revealed remarkable stability with regard to political practices of statehood, organisational 
knowledge, governing models, and symbolic traditions (Khazanov 2003). Russian nation-
formation clearly reflects the Mongol influence, such as in the use of the financial system (kazna 
[treasury]; den’gi [paper money]; altyn [gold currency]; tamga [commercial tax and customs]); 
in the development of sophisticated postal service for transmission of documents and information 
(Mongol jam, Russian iam); in the administrative apparatus design (daruga and baskaks 
governance management); in the organization of the periodic population census starting in 1257; 
in the organization of military and foreign affairs; and in political institutional continuity on a 
wide post-Mongol-imperial scale (Perdue 2005, Ostrowski 1998). However, as Russia matured 
as a nation, symbols of Mongol heritage required thorough work of censorship and 
reinterpretation in Tsarist and Soviet modular narratives. 
 In Russian and Soviet historiography and social sciences, the rise of nomadic nations was 
traditionally represented as extremely regressive and which brought a great negative impact on 
the conquered populations. As Perdue (2005: 7) argued: ‘mechanical theses of environmental 
determinism likewise deprived the Central Eurasians of any agency, tending to reduce them to 
mere biological actors’. 
 During Stalin’s totalitarian regime, this discourse was established by Communist Party 
orders in 1943 and 1945 that oriented scholars to interpret the role of the Mongol Empire in 
Russia as a source of negative influence, violence, and distortion (Dode 2001, 2005, Gallyamova 
2014). For example, despite the fact that in 1907-10 Gorodtsev and Prozritelev found valuable 
archaeological materials among the ruins of the Mongol-Tatar city Madjar, all the archaeological 
research projects on the 13th- and 14th centuries nomadic culture were stopped for almost a 
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century (Babenko 2001). The costumes of a young elite couple discoveries in the kurgan [hill] 
cemetery Djukhta-2, the Mongol-Tatar commercial centre of the Khanate of Juchi, combined 
with the Kalmyk epic narrative “Janghar” document Kalmyk nomadic cultural preferences, 
artistic styles and luxury possessions typical of this period (Dode 2001, 2005). However, what is 
significant, in the context of this study, is not just the symbolic meaning behind the 
archaeological artefacts, but rather the evidence of the state’s deliberate attempts to silence 
nomadic claims of nationhood.  
 The Mongol-Tatar Yoke stereotype was meticulously developed and violently intensified 
by the authoritarian regime. On the 9th of August 1944, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union adopted the order "On the status of the Tatar Communist party and the 
measures to improve the political and ideological work with the masses." The order determined a 
new orientation in the Arts and Humanities to disseminate the barbaric image of the Mongol-
Tatar history. The name of Juchi’s Ulus was eliminated in all publishing materials. The order 
prohibited any research that reveals the Mongol-Tatar statehood and its positive impact on the 
cultural and political development of the Russian state (Gallyamova 2014).  
 The Mongol Imperial origin of the post-Chingissid khanates, including the Kalmyk, 
Kazan, Crimean Khanates, were rewritten. For example, the order mandated to establish the 
relationship between the Kazan Tatarstan and the Bulgars with an emphasis on the period before 
the Mongol-Tatar Horde. In literature, music, dramaturgy, Stalin’s censorship police targeted the 
Mongol-Tatar writers’ “tendencies toward a passionate display of the medieval times and their 
affinity with the oral heroic epics, upon which the modern plots and characters were based” 
(Gallyamova 2014). In Kazan Tatarstan, the publication of the Tatar heroic epic “Edigei,” which 
is named after the Mongol Chinggisid leader, was terminated. When Kalmyks were deported to 
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Siberia and the Kalmyk toponymy was erased from the cultural and political maps, Semyon 
Lipkin’s (1947) adaptation of the Kalmyk epic “Jangar” for children was published without the 
authorship word “Kalmyk.” Stalin policies intensified the colonial leitmotif conveying the 
“voluntary entrance” of the Kalmyk, Kazan, Crimean Khanates into Muscovy Russia and the 
Russian state’s progressive impact on the backward Mongol-Tatar people (Gallyamova 2014). 
 It is evident that Tsarist and Soviet regimes dictated that scholars employ the obstruction 
and manipulation of factors that contribute to the outcome of ‘being a nation.’ Most scholars 
backed by these regimes disseminated the symbolic elements of their narration. These contents 
of the modular narrative are as follows: 
1. Positioned in a traditional/modern dichotomy as traditional, nomads are outside of the 
realm of modern nations (Contents 1-4: Markov1976, Kradin 1992, Ginat and Khazanov 
1998). 
2. As nomads, Kalmyks are placed in the evolutionary scheme “band-tribe-chiefdom.”  
3. Only with certain degree of sedentarisation may Kalmyks obtain the full features of 
chiefdom. 
4. Kalmyk alliances are unstable and short-lived. They have no legitimate links to Chinggis 
Khan or his son Juchi’s khanate. 
5. The official origin of the Kalmyks begins in 1620 under the Russian Tsar Mikhail’s 
guidance, who allowed the rootless nomads to roam along the Southern border pastures 
(Khodarkovsky 1992; Bichurin 1834). This date was commemorated in the Russian, 
Soviet, and post-Soviet state sponsored events, school textbooks and academic writings. 
6. The Central Eurasian steppe belt is not the locality of nomadic culture. All archaeological 
discoveries are strictly censured (Dode 2001, 2005, Babenko 2001).  
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What these elements of the modular narrative share is an imagination that nomads exist outside 
of the domain of modern nations. The relegation of nomads to the sphere of the traditional within 
this confined paradigm ensured the narrative was an effective and powerful instrument for the 
exercise of control of the vast territories of the Eurasian continent. The analysis of Kalmyk 
nationhood outside of these teleological linear interpretations (from traditional to modern, from 
bandits to tribes to chiefdoms, from nomadic to sedentary) enables us to conceptualize nomads 
without denying the historical possibility of cultural institutions and values that might not 
conform to the Christian, Communist, and post-Communist sedentary principles. We argue that 
the Kalmyk ingenuity of nomadic national survival stems not from a national identity based on 
these linear understandings of nationhood, but rather from a cultural difference within a modular 
narrative of controlled imagination. The myths of descent, golden age of civilization, and heroes 
of war and peace in readings of nationhood (Smith 1986) embody the imagined difference of an 
evolving Kalmyk culture that has sought its own ways of coping with modernity and freeing 
itself from a Russian modular narrative of controlled imagination.  
 
How did the Kalmyks understand themselves as a nomadic nation? 
 In Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia, Thomas Allsen (2001), a professor of 
history at College of New Jersey, stated that the rise of the Mongol nomads has been 
traditionally associated with non-ethnic Mongol human agents, recruited for their foreign 
governing capabilities and talents. However, existing nomadic narratives on nomadic agents of 
cultural and political transmission challenge past theories that the Mongol nomads were not 
capable to govern the Mongol Empire and build their versions of states and nations (Allsen 2001, 
Perdue 2005). Kolesnik (2003) emphasised that Kalmyks were known for their great 
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transcontinental migrations, their mastery in transcontinental governance, and the establishment 
of their own sovereign nation-state (Kolesnik 2003, Perdue 2005, Allsen 2001). The aim of this 
section is to explain how the Kalmyk nomads perceived themselves as a nomadic nation through 
collective ties expressed in myths, historical accounts, legal codes of laws, and human agents of 
national governance (Smith 1986). The intensity and political importance of nomadic sentiments 
are discussed here against symbolic contents of the nation-destroying modular narrative of the 
Russian and Soviet state regimes. 
 
Myths of Descent 
 The nation-destroying modular narrative dictates that Kalmyk alliances are unstable, 
short-lived and that they have no legitimate links to Chinggis Khan or his son Juchi and his 
khanate. However, the mythical origin of hereditary noble dynasties has been a symbolically 
significant element in the narration of nomadic national difference. The original name of the 
Kalmyks was the Dorben-Oirat confederation based on two major hereditary noble dynasties 
Dorben and Oirat (Zlatkin 1983: 13, Grum-Grzhimailo 1896, Banzarov 1849). Grum-Grzhimailo 
(1896) emphasized that the coalition between these two political dynasties was established 
during the years of Chinggis Khan. According to The Secret History of the Mongols (Kafarov 
1866; Kozin 1941; Cleaves 1982), written two decades after Chinggis Khan`s death in the 13th 
century, the Dorben [meaning four] were descendants from the four sons of Duva Soqor, a 
mythical figure with one eye, who could see across three pastures. Duva Soqor found the 
beautiful Alan-Goa and married her to his young brother Dobun-Mergen. The descendants of 
Alan-Goa, including Chinggis Khan’s dynasty of Bordjigin, became the primary hereditary 
nobility of the Mongol nomads from the Middle Ages to the present time. 
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 While the Dorben hereditary lineage shared the same myth of origin with Chinggis 
Khan's noble dynasty, the Oirats had a humble origin. As stated in The Secret History of the 
Mongols, they were the descendants of the forest people of the Yenisey River. In 1207, however, 
the socio-political role of the Oirats changed. Quduqa-beki, the prince of the Oirats, was the first 
to accept the alliance under the leadership of Chinggis Khan. The Khan recognized the military 
might and large size of the Oirat army. He named Quduqa-beki kurgen [in-laws] and married his 
two daughters to Quduqa-beki’s sons. The Confederation of Dorben-Oirat joined the army of 
Juchi in his European expansion and the establishment of Juchi’s Ulus (the Golden Horde) on the 
Volga River. 
 In a nomadic society, the nomadic political elite based on the kurgen [in-law] status, a 
matrimonial lineage to Chinggis Khan, should not be underestimated (Arapov 2003, Boyle 1958, 
Kolbas 2006, Landa 2016). In spite of Chinggis Khan’s effective social transformation of a 
nomadic society from familial ties to decimal governing units, Chinggis Khan’s in-laws, the 
Oirats, maintained their familial unity and became an alternative nomadic force in a post-
Chinggis Eurasia. Elevated by the imperial kurgen status, the Dorben-Oirat political dynasties 
found a new call for a military and state-building leadership at the expanding frontiers of the 
nomadic cultural transmission.  
  What concerns us here is not the myth of origin and formation itself, but rather how the 
cultural durability of nationhood is encoded in the myth of defiant imagination against a 
particular modular narrative: namely, that of the regime-backed commemoration of the Kalmyks’ 
origin only in 1620 and censure of the Mongol imperial origin of modern nations in Eurasia. The 
myth of one-eyed Duva Soqor and The Secret History of the Mongols highlights the ancient 
origin and long-lived nomadic alliances of the Dorben-Oirat confederation that can be traced 
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back to the 13th century. Directly connected to Chinggis Khan through a matrimonial lineage, the 
Dorben-Oirat in-laws became an alternative force in the modern Eurasian geopolitics. The sheer 
fact that no other modern nations have been linked to the Mongolian-speaking native empire of 
Chinggis Khan, nomadic transcontinental governance, civilization, and literary culture as closely 
as the Kalmyk nomads has been a potent element for their defiant imagination and an antidote to 
both the Russian and Soviet modular nation-narration. 
 
Agents of Governance 
 Nomadic narratives on the agents of cultural and political transmission challenge past 
accounts that Kalmyks are not capable of governing and building their versions of states and 
nations (Allsen 2001, Kolbas 2006, Landa 2016). The transmission of the Mongol nomadic 
governance and culture was connected with direct human agencies and capabilities; in this 
transmission, the Kalmyk noble dynasties Dorben and Oirats were positioned to become direct 
agents (Allsen 2001, Kolbas 2006, Landa 2016). The original name of the Kalmyks was the 
Confederation of Dorben-Oirat dynasties. While Chinggisids, linked to Chinggis Khan through a 
patrimonial lineage, moved imperial personnel, subject peoples, and nomadic state specialists 
from one cultural zone to another, Chinggis Khan’s kurgens Dorben-Oirats became the principal 
conduit of the nomadic governance and cultural transmission (Allsen 2001). The Persian 
statesmen and historians Rashid-Ad-Din (1247-1318) and Ata-Malik Juvaini (1226-1283) 
provided extensive contemporaneous accounts of the role of Dorben-Oirats in the nomadic 
strategic governance and operation throughout the Middle Eastern and Eurasian lands. Notably, 
they wrote about two well-known cultural and political intermediaries: the governor Bolad and 
the Emir Arghun Aqa (Boyle 1958, Allsen 2001, Kolbas 2006; Lane 1999). We will focus on 
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these two cultural figures here who both illustrate the power of endogenous agency in the 
narratives of nomads.  
 Firstly, according to Rashid-Ad-Din (Verkhovskiy 1960), Bolad, a Dorben noble, a 
senior figure under Kublai Khan held many important positions which contributed to the 
development of state craft including the establishment of the Office of State Ceremonials, the 
retraining of the imperial guardsmen, the maintenance of bridges, canals, irrigation, pastures, and 
agronomic farming and the development of the military (Verkhovskiy 1960; Allsen 2001: 76).  
 Secondly, Arghun Aqa’s career alludes to the Dorben-Oirats’ capabilities in building and 
governing transcontinental states and nations (Boyle 1958, Lane 1999; Kolbas 2006). Ata-Malik 
Jovaini, a historian at the Mongol court of Northern Persia, stressed that Arghun Aqa held the 
principal role in the Mongol transcontinental governance as an Oirat kurgen  (Boyle 1958: 505): 
 ‘The Oirats are one of the best known of the Mongol tribes, and to that tribe belong most 
 of the maternal uncles of the children and grand-children of Chinggis Khan, the reason 
 being that at the time of his first rise to power the Oirats came forward to support and 
 assist him and vied with one another in their alacrity to tender allegiance, and in 
 recognition of their services an edict was issued concerning that tribe to the effect that 
 the daughters of their emirs should be married to the descendants of Chinggis Khan.’ 
The Oirat Emir Arghun Aqa administratively shaped the western lands of the Mongol Empire. 
As a professor of history at Miami University Judith Kolbas (2006) highlighted, Arghun Aqa had 
military, financial and, above all, political acumen that allowed him to have his finger on the 
pulse of every major event for thirty-two years. Moreover, Mongol power in its transcontinental 
scale cannot be understood without appreciating his immense role in establishing it (Kolbas 
2006). 
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These nomadic counter-narratives, through the bibliographic description of these key 
figures, provide the perspective from the nomads themselves, suggesting that the Eurasian 
nomads were not only positioned to build, govern, and operate transcontinental early empires, 
but also were culturally complex and politically capable of building their versions of modern 
states and nations. In the process of cultural construction, nomadic nations sought heroes of war 
and peace of transcontinental scale to inspire and guide them through the times of modern 
disenchantment.   
 
Written Records 
 By the end of the 16th century, the Torgut hereditary princes gained power in the 
Dorben-Oirat Confederation.  The name Tourgout means ‘elite guard troops’ of the Mongol 
Khans, reflecting Chinggis Khan’s effective social transformation of a nomadic society from 
familial ties to decimal military units (Guchinova 2006, Avlyaev 1984). After the disintegration 
of the Chinggis Khan’s empire, Tourgouts led the Dorben-Oirat forces in their ambitious 
projects. The Torgut leader Kho-Orluk (orluk means knight/general) convinced the Dorben-Oirat 
political elite that he would rejuvenate the nomadic dominance in Eurasian steppe.  
 The account of Kalmyk transcontinental governance and nation formation under the 
leadership of Kho-Orluk was documented in The History of Kalmyk Khans, written by Prince 
Tyumen in 1819: “In 1618, Kho-Orluk Khan sent his people to see the shores of the Caspian Sea. 
When he learned that this land was not occupied, he took the people under his power – Torgut, 
Qoshot, and Dorbet, altogether 50,000 smokes (or tents), and followed by his six sons in 1628 
left his settlement in the Jungar Khanate and started his move to the West.”  
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 Another historical document The History of Dorben Oirats, written by Emchi (Doctor of 
Medicine) Gaban Sharab in 1737, signals Kalmyks’ sovereign political decision in the 
establishment of the Kalmyk Khanate: “From the Ural Mountains to the Volga, from Astrakhan 
to Samara Kho-Orluk Khan spread his settlements for permanent pastures. Even though this 
country belonged to the Tsagan-Khan (White Tsar) and Kho-Orluk had a friendly relationship 
with him, Kho-Orluk obtained this country, which he liked, without acknowledging the Tsar or 
subordinating to him.”  
 The nomadic narration of nationhood remained the cultural currency of political 
negotiation in Kalmyk nation formation. It reinforced the Kalmyks' perspective that the Eurasian 
steppe belt was a traditional locality of the Eurasian nomads and their choice to establish the 
Khanate in the Great Steppe was based on a strategic goal of transcontinental sovereign 
governance. Initially, the Kalmyk Khanate was situated on the territory of Juchi's Ulus, however, 
by the end of the seventeenth century, Kalmyks' transcontinental governance encompassed the 
land from the Caspian Sea in the West to Alashan in the East and from the Ural Mountains in the 
North to the Indian borders in the South (Zlatkin 1983, Guchinova 2006). 
 Other notable narratives written in Oirat Script include “How the Oirats Defeated 
Mongolian Ubashi Khun-Taiji in 1578” (unknown author; discovered in Prince Tyumen’s 
archive in 1858) about the three wars for the establishment of Oirat sovereignty; “The Moon 
Light: The Life of ‘Rabdzhamba’ [Doctor of Philosophy] Zaya Pandita” written by Padnabhadra 
in 1691 about the founder of the Oirat literary language and national literature; and “The Great 
Oirat-Mongol Law” written in 1640 (Golstunskiy 1880, Badmaev 1968, Guchinova 2006). This 
Kalmyk historical literature highlights that nation-narration is never complete. This inevitably 
bred a reaction among the Kalmyk intellectuals to intensify a unified Kalmyk language and 
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historical literature. In the process of nation narration, not only must nomads be founded upon 
the nomadic cultural core; they must also update their nation-narration within a nomadic cultural 
structure.  
 
Legislature 
 The Eurasian nomads continued to maintain their political and cultural practices in 
accordance with Chinggis Khan’s governing system long after their nomadic empire had 
disintegrated. Since the times of Chinggis Khan, nomadic governance consisted of the legislative 
(khurultai), executive (khan), and judicial (zargo) branches. The khurultai (the All Nomadic 
Congress) played a great role among all nomadic nations. The most important political decisions 
were resolved by the khurultai-congress that served as “an organ maintaining the state” (Arapov 
2003: 158; Gurliand 1904). Khurultai-congresses enacted legislation, rejected or confirmed the 
Khans, authorized major coalitions and wars.  
 It is important to stress that the laws and practices of the Mongol empire were not only 
well codified but also more advanced than comparable laws of other nations. The legislative 
structure protected the rights of women, migrants and religious minorities, as well as supported a 
merit-based professional service and the advancement of sciences. Jean de Joinville (Smith 
2008), a chronicler of medieval France, emphasised that the Yasa law code declared the death 
penalty for sexual misconduct or harassment of a Mongol woman regardless of the marital status, 
ensuring woman’s security and social order during their peaceful migrations and military 
expeditions. The Yasa also ordered to support individuals of certain professions and exempt them 
from taxes. These professions were “lawyers, doctors, scientists, people who were fully 
dedicated to religions and funeral services” (Gurliand 1904; Vernadskiy 1953). The power of the 
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Yasa of Chinggis Khan was based on the discipline, cultural and religious tolerance and 
established a peaceful stability allowing for travel and trade throughout China, Turkestan, Persia, 
and Russia within the Mongol empire.  
 With the fall of the Chinggisid dynasty, the Kalmyk political elite, the Confederation of 
Dorben-Oirat, consolidated nomadic power in the Eurasian steppe. In 1640, following the 
nomadic legislative order, Kho-Orluk from the Kalmyk Khanate, Gushi from Tangut, Tushetu 
from Tibet, Dzasaktu from Eastern Mongolia, and Ochirtu-Tsesen and Batur-khong-tayiji from 
the Jungar Khanate gathered at the Khurultai Congress in Western Mongolia. The Congressmen 
agreed to discuss the political unity and to codify a set of laws for all Mongol people. The All 
Mongol Congress in 1640 called upon the khanates to adopt the Mongol-Kalmyk Code of Laws 
entitled “Tsaadjin Bichig” (Golstunkskiy 1880). The Mongol-Kalmyk Code of Laws followed 
the nomadic social order and was based on the Yasa of Chinggis Khan of the XIII century, as 
well as legal materials such as paidzi and yarlyk (Gurliand 1904). The Law established 
Buddhism of the Dalai-Lama as an official religion for all Mongol nomads (Zlatkin 1983). 
 The organization of the Khutultai Congress in Western Mongolia and the adoption of the 
Law Code “Tsaadjin Bichig” were attributed to the political activity of the philosophy scholar 
Zaya-Pandita (1599-1662) (Padnabhadra 1691, Badmaev 1968). Over the period of twelve years 
from 1650 to 1662, Zaya-Pandita developed the Kalmyk script and philosophical terminology. 
Todo-bichig, which means ‘a clear script’, became the official language in academic, 
administrative, and foreign affairs. Under the leadership of Zaya-Pandita, Kalmyks established 
their distinct national culture: the national code of law “Tsaadjin Bichig” and the national 
language and literature. But most importantly, the major role of Zaya-Pandita was his successful 
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political mission to build a nation based on the institution of the Dalai-Lamas, a new legitimating 
symbol of power, an alternative to the patrimonial descent from Chinggis Khan.  
 Resistance to the nation-destroying modular narrative spurred a revival of national 
consciousness among nomadic intellectuals. While their narration of legislature and literature 
was not original work, it was a reform that aimed to intensify the inherited regulatory policies of 
their Mongol imperial predecessors. It was within this crucible, the Mongol imperial governing 
and operational system, that national consciousness was captured and revived among the Kalmyk 
nomads and the wider nomadic community of the Great Steppe.  
 
The rise of the nation 
 Kalmyk nationhood reached a peak under the leadership of Ayuka Khan (Kho-Orluk’s 
great-grandson). A progeny of a marriage between elites in the Kalmyk and Jungar Khanates, by 
the 1680s Ayuka had accumulated power and prestige in the Eurasian steppe with new symbols 
of sovereignty for the Kalmyks. By the beginning of the 1700s the Dalai-Lama, the Ottomans 
and the Russians recognized the Kalmyk sovereign title of Khan which Ayuka had bestowed 
upon himself. However, in nomadic terms, the recognition by the Russians or Ottomans was not 
considered as a diplomatic act of symbolic power, compared with the recognition by the Crimean 
Khan, the last Chinggisid of the Eurasian steppe. The Crimean Khan Giray was one of the first to 
acknowledge Ayuka as a Khan (Khodarkovsky 1992). The rise of the Kalmyk Khanate under 
Ayuka was possible through the narration of an imagined community that believed in the 
alternative myth of legitimacy through Chinggis Khan’s matrimonial lineage and the Dalai 
Lama’s institution of sacred reincarnations. 
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 Nation-narration is never without a hero (Smith 1986) and nomadic nation-narration is 
never without a heroic khan. The rise of Ayuka the Khan enhanced the myth of national 
creativity and durability: the nomads once capable of leading transcontinental governing systems 
and creating agents of governance like Arghun-Aqa, Bolad-Aqa, Zaya-Pandita, must have human 
capabilities to create heroic khans like Ayuka and future treasures of governance. While khan 
was an important symbol of the nomadic governance, not every khan was a national hero. The 
significance of a heroic khan in his own locality of the Great Steppe and among his nomadic 
community lies in his role to sum up a nomadic cultural milieu, which in its highest moments 
exerted a powerful appeal to sovereign unity free from external constraints. 
 
Nation-destroying  
 After Ayuka-Khan’s death in 1724, the Kalmyk political elite became increasingly 
concerned with the Russian state’s interference in the internal affairs of the Kalmyk khanate, 
especially in the election process of the next Khan (Bichurin 1834: 189). In collaboration with 
Ayuka’s wife Darma-Bala, the Russian state confirmed Tseren-Donduk as first in line to 
succession, who was one of Ayuka’s weakest sons and was known for his alcoholic tendencies. 
However, the Kalmyk legislative members unanimously confirmed their own candidate Donduk-
Ombo, Ayuka-Khan’s grandson.  
 Political instability, and tension between the two candidates, continued until 1735 when 
Tseren-Donduk could not resist the pressure from the Kalmyk political elite anymore. After 
almost ten years, Donduk-Ombo returned from exile in Kuban. Within two years, Donduk-Ombo 
brought military and economic stability to the region and in 1757 he earned the title of sovereign, 
Donduk-Ombo-the Khan (Bichurin 1834: 219). However, the political stability of the Kalmyk 
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Khanate did not last long. The Russian state intensified the colonial regime through the policies 
of Christianization, crime forgiveness, mass relocation of Russian villagers to the Kalmyk 
pastures, and the restructuring of the Zargo judicial institution (Pozdneev 1886, Kostenko 1870).  
 In 1771, Kalmyks seeking to escape the Russian state decided to migrate from the 
European part of Russia to Western Mongolia. Khodarkovsky (1992: 232) called this journey 
“the last known exodus of a nomadic people in the history of Asia”. 150,000 people (30,909 
tents) started a journey that is memorized as a collective tragedy. Almost 100,000 Kalmyks were 
killed or died in the inhospitable climate of the steppes and deserts. In 1771, the Kalmyk nomads 
lost their independence. The Kalmyk Khanate was abolished, and the remaining 11,198 Kalmyk 
tents were assigned to the Astrakhan governorate of Russia. With the loss of the Khanate, the 
Kalmyk nomads became Russian subjects.  
 The tension between Russian control and the resistance to its power among the Kalmyk 
nomads is reflected in well-documented census records exposing the ‘nation-destroying’ process 
between 1618 -1959. The Kalmyk Khanate recorded 50,000 households in 1618 or, if a 
household on average had four people, approximately 200,000 people. The first census of the 
Russian Empire in 1890 registered 190,648 people.  
 The census records provide an account of at least three major atrocities in the Russian 
nation-building process: the abolishment of the Kalmyk Khanate in 1771, the sedentarisation of 
nomads in 1897-1926, and deportation to Siberia in 1942-1957. Demographic engineering 
resulted in the physical annihilation of the nation: the Kalmyk nation was abolished twice in 
1771 and 1942 and the proportion of the Russian settlers increased from 11 to 56 per cent in 
1926 and 1959 respectively (table 1).  
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Table 1. The Population of the Kalmyk Khanate/Republic by Ethnicity, 1618-1959 
            
 Ethnicity by Year 1618 1890 1926 1939 1959 
      Kalmyks 200,000 190,648 107,026 107,315 64,882 
 
(n/a) (n/a) (76%) (49%) (35%) 
      Russians n/a n/a 15,212 100,814 103,349 
 
(n/a) (n/a) (11%) (46%) (56%) 
      
      
Source 
Gaban-
Sharab Census Census Census Census 
 
          
      
       
 After the 1917 revolution, the Soviet reform of nationalities began. To consolidate Soviet 
power over the disintegrated people and territories, Lenin drafted a new ideology for nationalities 
based on the principles of the Declaration of People’s Rights. Since 1771, when the Kalmyk 
Khanate was abolished, Kalmyks were administered by the Russian guberniya of Astrakhan. 
With the establishment of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Kalmyks regained 
their autonomy, forming the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast in 1920 and advancing the status to the 
Kalmyk Autonomous Republic in 1935. The Soviet state was successfully transformed into a 
federative union of national republics. Local elites everywhere were confident that the new state 
would grant them ethno-territorial autonomy and supported the Soviet regime. However, Lenin’s 
promised freedom and social justice for all nationalities was short-lived.  
 During the Stalinisation of the Soviet system, many of the republics populations were 
deported to Siberia, their autonomous status was eliminated, and neighbouring Slavic oblasts 
consolidated control over newly claimed areas. Deported peoples such as Kalmyks, Chechens, 
Ingush, and Crimean Tatars were settled in special conditions to die. Thus, in the Novosibirsk 
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oblast, mortality among deported Kalmyks was 57 deaths per 1000 population and in rural 
regions mortality reached 80 people per 1000 population. Among all deported nations Kalmyks 
had the highest toll of mortality: 44,125 deaths were recorded in August 1948 (Guchinova 2005, 
Bugai and Gonov 1998).  
 On the 27th of December 1943, Decree number 115/144 of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR entitled “On the liquidation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic and the formation of Astrakhan Oblast within the RSFSR” was adopted and ordered to 
transfer nine territories of the Republic of Kalmykia to Astrakhan Okrug, two Kalmyk territories 
to Stalingrad Oblast and two remaining to Rostov oblast. The Decree ordered to identify all 
ethnically Kalmyk people of the former Kalmyk Republic and physically disperse them over the 
vast lands of Siberia: 25 thousand to Altai Krai, 25 thousand to Omsk Oblast, and 20 thousand to 
Novosibirsk Oblast (Guchinova 2005, Bugai and Gonov 1998).  
 In 1944 “Operation Ulusy” [in Kalmyk: ‘nation population’] led to 93,139 Kalmyks 
being loaded onto 46 special trains. Most of the Kalmyk men were Army conscripts, thus the 
operation was realised without any resistance. Kalmyks had less than half an hour to collect their 
belongings; they were loaded into cattle train wagons and were forcibly sent to an unknown 
destination. During Khrushchev's thaw, in 1958 the autonomous status of Kalmykia was 
regained. 
 
The rise of the intelligentsia 
 In Soviet Kalmykia, the nomadic transmission of cultural values shifted from the 
institution of the Dalai Lama to the moral stratum of intellectuals and professional specialists. 
Two leaders became collective agents in the revival of the nation: the poet David Kugutinov 
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(1922-2006) and the General Gorodovikov (1910-1983). Both stressed Kalmyks’ cultural 
uniqueness and political sovereignty.  
 The distinction between the rational state policies and the non-rational core of the 
national identity was expressed in a poem written by David Kugultinov in his response to 
Stalin’s deportation of the Kalmyks to Siberia. In 1944 Kugultinov was convicted by clause 
58/10 for his nationalist poetry and was sent to Norilsk State Special Regime Camp in Siberia. 
The poem “I have not renounced the truth [that I am Kalmyk]" became a cultural symbol of the 
Kalmyk national resistance against the Russian attempt to destroy the Kalmyk nation. 
 
I have not renounced the truth  
At that time unjust and savage rule 
Suppressed us… 
The light was lost for us 
And even the word “Kalmyks” 
People were afraid to pronounce. 
Then, with my words of poems I affirmed 
To friends I wrote, I consoled 
Those who were banished from their homes… 
I said to them: this squall will stop 
All that gnaws our souls will disappear, --  
Lenin’s enlightenment cannot be dimmed! 
Despite the facts I swore: 
Not only young and old - 
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But the entire Kalmyk nation will return  
To our ancestors’ graves and dear land. 
I saw how faces become younger, 
How an enlightened tear falls  
On a bronze and weather-beaten face, 
How hearing kindness rendered them kind, 
That was my highest sacred prize. 
 
Kugultinov’s nationalist poetry appealed to non-rational emotions and assisted in transforming 
the tangible pieces of the nation into the emotion-charged power of national unity. A spiritual 
bond between a scattered people through their emotions of collective trauma triggered the 
powerful workings of an imagined united nation.  
 This emotional and psychological underpinning of Kalmyk nationhood derived from 
Kugultinov’s poetry coincided with the rise of a new Kalmyk leader: General Gorodovikov. 
There were two favourable conditions for the rise of Gorodovikov: his general elite status that he 
earned during the war; and Khrushchev's thaw that allowed him to govern the Republic as the 
first non-Russian leader. Gorodovikov mobilized sufficient resources to rebuild Kalmykia 
through his negotiations with Moscow. During his leadership 1961-1980, Kalmykia developed 
new infrastructure – major trans-regional roads, train stations, airports, hospitals, schools, the 
National Kalmyk State University, the National Kalmyk Drama Theatre, but most importantly, 
collective farms based on traditional Kalmyk livestock (revived ancient breeds of Kalmyk 
camels, horses, cows, and sheep).  
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 Kalmykia became an economically prosperous region of the Russian Federation and one 
of the main producers of wool in the country. Gorodovikov formed a new Kalmyk elite out of 
top university graduate students and charged them with responsibilities to revive their 
community. However, in 1980, Gorodovikov was accused of the pro-Kalmyk nationalist 
propaganda. He was forced to resign and since then the Russians have occupied leading 
positions. However, the Kalmyk elite, created by Gorodovikov, continued to work as leaders of 
collective nomadic farms and build their careers in the thirteen regions of Kalmykia.  
 In post-Soviet Kalmykia, the narration of a nomadic nation was reinforced with the old 
cultural and political symbols against the dominant Russian Orthodox culture. As Zaya-Pandita 
in the seventeenth century, Telo Tulku Rinpoche became a contemporary agent of the imaginary 
workings of the nomadic unity. Born to a Kalmyk Mongolian family in the USA, he studied at a 
Tibetan Buddhist monastery in South India at the age of seven, when the Dalai Lama recognized 
him as a reincarnation of Mahasiddha Tilopa. Similar to Zaya-Pandita, who was sent to the 
Tibetan monastery in the seventeenth century, in the 1980-90s Telo Rinpoche spent thirteen 
years in Drepung Gomang monastery studying Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Buddhist philosophy under 
the guidance of famous Tibetan masters.  
 In 1991, during his first visit to Kalmykia with the Dalai-Lama, Telo Rinpoche decided to 
stay among the Kalmyks. In 1992, elected as Spiritual Leader of Kalmykia by the Kalmyk 
people, he was entrusted to lead the process of cultural restoration. Over his career in Kalmykia, 
Telo Rinpoche rebuilt over twenty-seven Buddhist temples that had been destroyed during the 
communist era, including the Golden Abode of Buddha Shakyamuni, the largest Buddhist 
institution in Russia and Europe. In 2015, the fourteenth reincarnation of the Dalai-Lama 
confirmed Telo Rinpoche as the spiritual head of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition in Kalmykia, 
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Mongolia, and Russia. Once again, the rise of the nomadic national unity is manifested through 
the historical transcontinental connection of two strategic nomadic centres, Tibet on one side and 
Kalmykia on the other side of the Eurasian steppe belt, where the nomadic cultural symbols 
emphasize their sovereign narration of nations, backed by the institution of the Dalai-Lama and 
political legitimacy through reincarnations. 
 
Conclusion 
 The forms and dynamics of nomadic nationhood represent an important category of 
contemporary geopolitics and are the outcomes of both developments: nation destroying, through 
a modular narrative of controlled imagination, and cultural resilience, through a nomadic 
narrative of imagined difference. Nations, using Connor’s (1994: 197) definition as “a 
psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its 
members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way,” are also determined by the cultural 
intermediaries between the nomadic imaginary community and the wider imaginary world of 
moral humanity. Nomadic nation-narration presents the intricate plot of a myth of honour and 
humanity, embedded inside the determinist structure of nationhood that, from the hero of war 
Chinggis Khan to the hero of peace Dalai Lama, contains a deeply imaginary response to 
nomads’ cultural and intellectual trajectory and resonates with the broader moral audience. This 
study demonstrates that nomadic nations are extremely adaptable to power conditions, flexible 
with reinventing cultural ideas and governing strategies, and determined by the cultural 
intermediaries between the nomadic imaginary community and the wider imaginary world. 
The absence of the nomadic actors in the global discourse of nationhood adds to the 
debate on nations, as Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1993) emphasized in their analyses: whose 
30 
 
nation-narrations are we reading if we account for the evidence of the regime’s deliberate 
obstruction of nationhood? The right to narrate sovereign narratives does not belong to the 
politically marginalised nomads. Nomadic epistemologies are considered to be mere myths, 
hidden in the forever immature underworld away from the possibility to contribute to the global 
discourse of nationhood. Russian and later Soviet research on the nomadic ‘nation-destroying’ 
exemplifies the subjective interpretation, as illustrated when historians speak of the origins of 
nations as a sign of modernity. 
The examination of nomadic nations from the position of their own narration opens a 
space for debates on the modular stability of cultural and political institutions that operate on the 
traditional assumptions of the sedentary modular narrative. Positioning the debate from the 
contrasting narrative of the nomadic perspective allows us to imagine nomadic nations with their 
own heroic protagonists, the principal conduits of the nomadic cultural transmission. This case 
study of the Kalmyk nomads may contribute to further understanding contemporary geopolitical 
issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially Tatar Crimea, Tibet, Xinjiang and Hazarajat 
(Bamyan, Afghanistan) whose populations all share their nomadic past with the Mongol Empire.  
The engagement in the so-called “Great Game” (Clubb 1971) which is re-enacted through the 
Russian “Eurasianism” policy, the Chinese “Belt and Road” strategic initiative, and the US 
“New Afghanistan War Strategy” poses predictable traps to the Russian-Sino- American triangle 
in the region known as the “graveyard of empires.” The outcome of these strategic manoeuvrings 
will inevitably benefit from attention to the cultural and political institutions of the nomadic 
players and their construction of nation-narration. Their inclusion may ensure greater regional 
stability by preventing cultural misinterpretation, conflict, and the attendant economic burden 
and loss of human life.  
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